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STUDENT NOTES

CHANGING CONCEPTS IN THE AD
VALOREM SEVERANCE TAXATION OF
COAL IN WEST VIRGINIA
I.

INTRODUCTION

The taxation of coal is a primary source of revenue for the
majority of states in which coal is an abundant natural resource.
This taxation of coal is referred to as either a severance, privilege,
excise, occupation, or license tax in the various states." The tax is
a "levy assessed at flat or graduated rates by a government on the
privilege, process, or act of commercially severing or extracting
natural resources... and measured by the physical amount, or
'2
the gross or net value of the natural resources produced or sold.
If the levy is assessed at a flat rate for each unit s extracted, it is
referred to as a specific severance tax, while an ad valorem severance tax is the term used to describe a levy assessed at a graduated rate.4 The ad valorem severance tax may be distinguished
from an ad valorem property tax in that the latter is usually an
annual levy based on the assessed valuation of unrecovered coal, 5
while the former is based on the value of coal actually extracted
from the ground during a specified period.6 Ad valorem severance
taxes also differ considerably from income taxes in that the severance tax base is total production while the income tax base is net
I Note, Coal Taxation in the Western States: The Need for a Regional Tax
Policy, 16 NAT. Ras. J. 415, 426 (1976).

' Whiteside & Gillig, Coal and Cinservation-Tax Policy, 64 Ky. L.J. 573,
596 (1976).

The unit usually used is the short ton (2,000 pounds).
' Ad valorem severance taxes are imposed as a certain percentage of an assessed value such as gross value, market value, gross yield, gross receipts, or net
proceeds, e.g., one percent (1%) of gross receipts realized from the sale of coal.
5 See generally, Symposium, Ad Valorem Taxation of Coal Property, 76 W.
VA. L. REv. 255 (1974).
6 Note, Coal Taxation in the Western States: The Need for a Regional Tax
Policy, supra note 1, at 427.
3
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income or profit.7
Recent litigation at the trial court level in West Virginia has
raised the issue concerning at what point in the overall process
(from severing the coal from the earth in its natural state to delivering it to the ultimate consumer), the coal is to be valued and
subjected to the ad valorem severance tax.8 Because this issue
does not involve the specific severance taxation of coal, this Note
is expressly limited to the ad valorem severance taxation of coal.
Furthermore, although analogies with the taxation of other natural resources such as natural gas, timber, sand and gravel, etc., are
sometimes helpful, this Note does not seek to comment directly
upon the taxation of these other natural resources.
II.

NATURE AND HISTORY

A.

Nature

Generally, severance taxes are imposed as a means of raising
revenue. Alternatively, the severance tax may be imposed as an
overall or long-term policy effected by the legislature in an attempt to impose equitable tax burdens on the different segments
of the economy, to maintain a high level of employment, to encourage economic growth, and to provide public security. Another rationale often used to support a severance tax is that it
constitutes a partial atonement to the state for the value of its
underground wealth diminished by mining. To a lesser degree,
the taxes are justified as substitutes for property taxes where the
taxable property is minerals. This rationale was adopted by the
Montana court 0 as follows:
The state in effect says to producers: Your operations deplete
the natural resources of the state, and to the extent that you
remove from the earth the natural wealth which nature has
provided it, and to that extent impoverish it, you are required
to pay a license tax for the use and benefit of the state, for the
Whiteside & Gillig, supra note 2, at 597.
8 Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. Dailey, No. CA-6546 (Cir. Ct. Mingo
County, W. Va. July 16, 1979).
9 Note, Approaches to State Taxation of the Mining Industry, 10 NAT. RES.

J. 156 (1970).
10 State ex rel. Snidow v. State Bd. of Equalization, 93 Mont. 19, 17 P.2d 68,
writ of mandamus enforced, 18 P.2d 804 (1933).
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natural wealth. The tax provided is
minerals, or mine products, but
of producing metals or precious
production."1

Thus, a severance tax may be viewed either as a tax upon the

privilege of producing property for economic use, or as a tax upon
the privilege of removing and destroying the wealth of the state."'
The ad valorem severance tax, as previously discussed, is a
privilege tax and not a property tax or a production tax. The tax
is not imposed upon the property itself, but upon the privilege of
extracting the coal from the earth."3 This is true even though the
measure of the tax is the value of the coal extracted. That value
serves only as a means of measuring the privilege of extraction.
Furthermore, since the tax is a privilege tax, it is not subject to
the traditional principles of a property tax. Most importantly,
there is no constitutional provision requiring the application of a
uniform rate to all classes of businesses or callings on which the
privilege taxes are imposed. The legislature may exercise discretion in classifying the subjects of taxation for privilege tax purposes, although this discretion is limited by the requirement that
all persons who are similarly situated must be brought within the
same class, and all members of the class must be treated uniformly. 14 Thus, classification for privilege tax purposes will not
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment

to the Constitution of the United States

5

if the classification is

n Id. at 34, 17 P.2d at 72.
"Dayton, Excise Taxes in Their Relationship to Property Taxes, 46 W. VA.
L.Q. 21, 29 (1939). Dayton notes that "t]he depletion of the land and the consequent continuing diminution of the wealth of the state" are strong arguments for
a severance tax. Id.
" The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted this position in Cole
v. Pond Fork Oil & Gas Co., 127 W. Va. 762, 35 S.E.2d 25 (1945):
Our Legislature has studiously avoided imposing a production tax, and
has resorted to the imposition of a privilege tax, whereby persons, firms,
and corporations are classified according to the business in which they
are engaged, and a tax collected from the gross proceeds of their business, rather than upon any product which they may produce from the
earth or manufacture or process.
Id. at 776, 35 S.E.2d at 32. See also Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. E. L
duPont de Nemours & Co., 217 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1975).
' Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 179 (1922).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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reasonable, is based on pertinent and real differences, and has as
its object a purpose germane to the legislation."8 An application of
this reasoning would be the classification of all natural resource
producers in one class, all manufacturers in a second class, all
wholesalers in a third class, etc. Within each of these classes, several different rates may be applicable so long as each member of
the class similarly situated is taxed at the same rate, For instance,
in the natural resource classification may be found coal producers, oil and natural gas producers, timber producers, etc., with the
coal producer being taxed at a rate of one percent of gross proceeds and the natural gas producer being taxed at a rate of two
percent of gross proceeds. So long as all coal producers are taxed
at one percent and all natural gas producers are taxed at two percent, there is no violation of constitutional requirements.
A second distinction between a privilege tax and a property
or production tax is that under a privilege tax a person may be
classified and taxed for the simultaneous exercising of two different privileges. Since the tax is imposed upon the privilege and not
upon the property, there is no double taxation even though the
property may be the measure of tax for both privileges. At least
in West Virginia, there is no statutory requirement nor principle
of law which precludes the imposition of more than one tax upon
a person who is engaged in different business activities as classified by the privilege taxing statute.17 Thus, a company which
manufactures a product and sells the same product at wholesale
could be properly taxed for both privileges upon the value of the
goods manufactured and sold. 8
B. History
The taxation of coal in West Virginia originated with the
passage of the Gross Sales Act in 1921.19 The Gross Sales Act
P Tweel v. West Virginia Racing Comm'r, 138 W. Va. 531, 76 S.E.2d 874,

appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 869 (1953). See also Arslain v. Alderson, 126 W. Va.
880, 30 S.E.2d 533 (1944); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Battle, 153 W. Va. 222, 167
S.E.2d 890 (1969).
17Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Haden, 200 S.E.2d 848, 854 (W. Va. 1973).
19 See also United Fuel Gas Co. v. Battle, 153 W. Va. 222, 167 S.E.2d 890
(1969); J.D. Moore, Inc. v. Tax Comm'r, 147 W. Va. 611, 129 S.E.2d 722 (1963).
1" 1921 W. VA. Acms, ch. 110, §§ 2a-2c. This act provided in pertinent partUpon every person engaging or continuing within this state, in the
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classified under section 2a both the producers of natural resources
and manufacturers. However, producers of coal were taxed at a
rate of 0.4% while manufacturers were taxed at a rate of 0.2%.
The Gross Sales Act was repealed in 1925 when the legislature
enacted the Business and Profession Tax.20 The 1925 act did not
materially change the tax structure except to reclassify manufacturing from section 2a to section 2b. Also, the tax rate on coal was
increased from 0.4% to 0.42%.
In 1933, the Business and Profession Tax was repealed and
the legislature adopted the Business and Occupation Tax. 21 The
Business and Occupation Tax was not substantially different
from the Business and Profession Tax. The most notable change
was the increase in tax rates to 1% for coal and 0.3% for
manufacturing.
Except for rate adjustments in 1934,22 1935, 2 3 and 1959,24 the
language of the statute remained unchanged until 1971, when the
tax rate on producing coal was increased from 1.35% to 3.5%,15
and the rate for manufacturing was increased to 0.88%.26 The
language of section 2a was also changed from "producing for sale,
profit or commercial use" to "severing, extracting, reducing to
possession and producing for sale, profit or commercial use.", 7
In 1975, an additional severance tax was imposed at the rate
of 0.35%.2' This additional tax effectively raised the total tax
burden for the producer of coal to 3.85%, which is the current tax
rate. The rate for manufacturers has not been adjusted since
1971.

business of mining and producing for sale, or for profit, any coal, ...
the amount of each tax [payable by that person shall be equal to] the
value of the articles produced as shown by the gross proceeds derived
from the sale thereof by the producer. . . multiplied by the respective
rates.
20 1925 W. VA. AcTs, 1st Extraordinary Sess., ch. 1, §§ 2a-2c.

31 1933 W. VA. AcTs, ch. 33, §§ 2a-2c.
21 1933 W. VA. AcTs, 2d Extraordinary Seas., ch. 66, tit. 1, §§ 1-10.
23 1935 W. VA. ACTs, ch. 86, §§ 2-2b.
24 1959 W. VA. AcTs, ch. 167.
"' W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a (1974 Replacement Vol.).
16 Id. § 2b (Cum. Supp. 1979).
17 Id. § 2a (1974 Replacement Vol.).
1 Id. § 21 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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III. Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. Dailey
Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. v. Dailey29 presented the
Circuit Court of Mingo County with factual circumstances which
clearly demonstrated the inconsistencies in the way in which the
Business and Occupation Tax was being imposed upon coal producers. In Gilbert, the petitioner was a coal producer who both
owned and leased coal lands. The petitioner mined these lands
through the services of a contract miner 0 who severed, extracted,
and delivered the coal to petitioner's tipple. After delivery, the
coal was subjected to the tippling processes, wherein the coal was
screened, picked, crushed, and washed.3 1 As a result of the tippling processes, approximately thirty percent of the raw coal delivered was removed as unsalable refuse, and the corresponding
value of the coal was increased from $11.00 per ton for the raw
coal to $17.50 per ton for the tippled coal.
The circuit court determined that the petitioner was the producer of the coal and was to be taxed at the producer's rate3 2 for
the production of the coal. 3 The petitioner contended that it was
only taxable at the producer's rate 4 for the value of the coal
before the tippling processes, but otherwise was taxable under the
No. CA-6546 (Cir. Ct., Mingo County, W. Va. July 16, 1979).
:9 A contract miner merely performs the service of severing and extracting
the coal without ever obtaining any title, ownership, or property interest whatsoever in the mineral itself.
3S The screening process generally consists of passing the raw coal over a
screen with holes of various sizes in it. This allows the larger chunks of coal to
remain on a conveyor belt from which they are removed manually. Large rock
refuse is also manually removed. The coal is then crushed to the desired size and
washed further to remove refuse. This is, at most, a very general description and
does not allude to more sophisticated processes which may include the use of
blending-mixing bins, specific gravity flotation techniques, and the like.
" W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a (1974 Replacement Vol.) provides as follows:
Upon every person exercising the privilege of engaging or continu-

ing within this State in the business of severing, extracting, reducing to
possession and producing for sale, profit or commercial use any natural
resource products, the amount of such tax to be equal to the value of the
articles produced as shown by the gross proceeds derived from the sale
thereof by the producer, except as otherwise provided, multiplied by the
respective rates as follows: Coal, three and five-tenths percent. ...
33 No. CA-6546, slip op. at 38.
W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a (1974 Replacement Vol.).
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manufacturer's classification

5

for its separate business activity of

processing raw coal and preparing it for sale. The circuit court,
mindful of the fact that a business entity exercising two or more
privileges must be taxed accordingly, determined that the petitioner was taxable under the manufacturing classification. The
pertinent statute provides that:
Upon every person engaging or continuing within this
State in the business of manufacturing,compounding or preparing for sale, profit or commercial use ..
any article or
articles, substance or substances, commodity or commodities,
...
the amount of the tax to be equal to the value of the
article, substance, [or] commodity ..
manufactured, compounded, or prepared for sale, as shown by the gross proceeds
derived from the sale thereof by the manufacturer or person
compounding or preparing the same, except as otherwise provided, multiplied by a rate of eighty-eight one hundredths of
one percent. The measure of this tax is the value of the entire
product manufactured, compounded or prepared in the State
for sale, profit or commercial use, regardless of the place of
sale or the fact that deliveries may be made to points outside
the state.36
The petitioner was found to have been employing "technologically sophisticated processes" in its tippling activities, 3 7 and
as such, was neither "manufacturing" nor "compounding" the
coal; rather, the petitioner's taxable activity was in "preparing"
the coal for "sale, profit or commercial use." A distinction was
noted, though, between the mere use of a coal tipple to load raw
coal onto coal cars and the use of a technologically sophisticated
process.
Thus, whether the processing of a natural resource by its producer constitutes a business activity under the manufacturing
classification apparently depends to a large extent upon the degree of processing to which the resource is subjected. Passing coal
through a tipple for the sole purpose of loading it into coal cars
serves only to transport it closer to the ultimate consumer, but
does not "prepare" that coal for use by the ultimate consumer,
and is therefore not considered a manufacturing business activity.
35 Id. § 2b (Cum. Supp. 1979).
36 Id. (emphasis as supplied by the circuit court).
" No. CA-6546, slip op. at 51.
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However, the passing of coal through a tipple, where it is "prepared, screened, graded, washed, etc.," is a prerequisite to use of
the coal by the ultimate consumer, and thus falls under the "preparing for sale" classification. This is true because foreign particles present in untippled coal are removed by the tippling process, even though the chemical make-up of the coal itself is not
changed by the tippling activities.
The court determined that subjecting the coal to the tippling
process constituted the "using or consuming" of the same as contemplated by a related tax provision. As such, the coal was to be
taxed at the production rate on its value prior to being subjected
to that process and at the manufacturing rate on its value subsequent to the process. The court further determined that the production of coal ended either when the coal is sold at the mine
mouth or, when it is to be delivered to coal tipple, immediately
prior to being subjected to the tippling process.
The court's reasoning largely followed the tax treatment of
coal brokers.8 9 Coal brokers who purchased coal and transported
it to a tipple where the coal was "prepared, screened, graded,
washed, etc.," were taxed under the manufacturing classification
while performing these activities.4" Apart from this tax treatment
of coal brokers, the producers of coal have traditionally been
taxed at the producer's rate on the gross proceeds of the sale of

3 W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The seventh paragraph of that
section provides:
A person exercising privileges taxable under the other sections of
this article, producing coal...

or other natural resource products the

production of which is taxable under section two-a, and using or consuming the same in his business... shall be deemed to be engaged in
the business of mining and producing coal... or other natural resource
products for sale, profit or commercial use, and shall be required to
make returns on account of the production of the business showing the
gross proceeds or equivalent in accordance with uniform and equitable
rules for determining the value upon which such privilege tax shall be
levied, correspondingas nearly as possible to the gross proceeds from
the sale of similar products of like quality or characterby other taxpayers, which rules the tax commissioner shall prescribe.
(emphasis as supplied by the circuit court.)
" A coal broker purchases coal from a mining entity and sells the same on
the open market. While he retains possession of the coal he may subject it to
tippling processes in the same manner as a producer.
40 W. VA. B & 0 TAx REG. § 1.2b(H) Ex.3 (CCH 1974).
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such coal, even though prior to sale they may subject their product to the tippling processes. 1
IV.

THE VALIDYTY OF THE

Gilbert DECISION

At issue in Gilbert was the proper classification of the petitioner's activities under the West Virginia Business and Occupation Tax law, a question requiring an interpretation of the statutes and a determination of their underlying legislative intent. In
construing tax statutes there exists a presumption that the legislature did not intend to violate any provision of the Federal Constitution. 42 Furthermore, taxing statutes are generally construed
by giving great deference to the legislative intent" as inferred
from every word in the statute." Even though taxing statutes are
to be strictly construed,45 undefined words of the statute should
be given their normal everyday interpretation." Deference should

also be given to disjunctive4 7 or conjunctive

s

expressions by

W. VA. B & 0 TAX REG. § 1.2a(G) Ex.1 (CCH 1974).
42 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 102 W. Va. 272, 135 S.E. 582 (1926); Eureka
41

Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 87 W. Va. 396, 105 S.E. 506 (1920).
43 Effect should be given to the spirit, purpose and intent of the lawmakers
without limiting the interpretation in such a manner as to defeat the underlying
purpose of the statute. Wooddell v. Dailey, 230 S.E.2d 466 (W. Va. 1976); State ex
rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma, 147 W. Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963).
" Each word of a statute should be given some effect and a statute must be
construed in accordance with the import of its language. Wooddell v. Dailey, 230
S.E.2d 466 (W. Va. 1976); Wilson v. Hix, 136 W. Va. 59, 65 S.E.2d 717 (1951);
Fielder & Turley v. Adams Express Co., 69 W. Va. 138, 71 S.E. 99 (1911).
45 Tax laws, generally, are strictly construed, and when there is doubt regarding the meaning of such laws they should be construed in favor of the taxpayer.
Wooddell v. Dailey, 230 S.E.2d 466 (W. Va. 1976); State ex rel. Battle v. Baltimore
& 0. Ry., 149 W. Va. 810, 143 S.E.2d 331 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 970 (1966);
State v. Carmen, 145 W. Va. 635, 116 S.E.2d 265 (1960).
4s Undefined words and terms used in a legislative enactment will be given
their common, ordinary and accepted meaning. Wooddell v. Dailey, 230 S.E.2d
466 (W. Va. 1976); Davis v. Hix, 140 W. Va. 398, 84 S.E.2d 404 (1954); Miners v.
Hix, 123 W. Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941). If technical words are involved they
will be presumed to have been used in a technical sense and will ordinarily be
given their strict meaning. Wooddell v. Dailey, 230 S.E.2d 466 (W. Va. 1976); Lane
v. Board of Ed., 147 W. Va. 737, 131 S.E.2d 165 (1963).
47 The word "or", as used in a statute, is a disjunctive particle indicating that
the various members of the sentence are to be taken separately. 73 AB. Jun. 2d
Statutes § 241 (1974). See also Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 207
S.E.2d 897, 921 (W. Va. 1974).
48 The word "and" as used in a statute is a conjunctive particle indicating
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which words or phrases in the statute may be connected. The presumption of constitutional validity of the statute, 49 and the constitutional requirement that all those taxpayers similarly situated
be treated uniformly,50 form the bounds within which the enumerated canons of construction must be applied.
The first concern is whether the primary purpose of the statute will be defeated if the Gilbert rationale is followed. The basic
purpose of the statute is the raising of revenue.5 1 This purpose
will not be defeated by the application of the Gilbert rationale,
since producers of coal who sell their coal at the mouth of the
mine will be taxed on the value of the coal at the time of the sale;
producers of coal who also subject their coal to technologically
sophisticated tippling processes will be taxed both at the production rate on the value of the coal prior to tippling and at the manufacturing rate subsequent to tippling; and coal brokers will continue to be taxed at the manufacturing rate on the value of the
coal subsequent to the tippling process. This is not to say that the
total revenue from the taxation of coal producers will not be effected, but rather that the exercise of these activities will still
yield revenue.
The second concern involves the correct interpretation of the
language of the statute, as well as its overall import. The provisions of each section of the statute are to be read and considered
in pari materiawith all other sections of the statute.52 Where the
wording of the statute, or the words themselves, is clear and unambiguous, the statute or the words should be applied and not
construed. 53 Previous decisions have recognized that section 2 is
the only portion of article 13 which provides for the imposition of

that the various members of the sentence are to be considered jointly. Authorities
cited note 47 supra.
4' See note 42 supra & accompanying text.
50 See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
51 See note 9 supra & accompanying text.
11 Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Battle, 151 W. Va. 655, 665, 154 S.E.2d 854, 860
(1967).
Wooddell v. Dailey, 230 S.E.2d 466 (W. Va. 1976); State ex rel. Hardesty v.
Aracoma, 147 W. Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963). See also Eggleton v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 214 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 1975); Russell Transfer, Inc. v.
Moore, 212 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1975), State v. Carmen, 145 W. Va. 635, 116 S.E.2d
265 (1960).
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a tax.5 The word "taxable" as it appears in the other sections of
article 13 refers merely to the rate of tax which is imposed by
section 2.5

The words or provisions subject to interpretation in section
2a include "severing, extracting, reducing to possession and producing for sale" and "except as otherwise provided." By using
"and" in the former phrase, the legislature must have intended
that the terms be considered jointly. As such, no real difficulty is
encountered in interpreting the words "severing," "extracting,"
and "reducing to possession," since these words are unambiguous
and, therefore, accorded their common, ordinary, and accepted
meaning. However, "producing" is ambiguous and must be construed. Webster defines the term as meaning "to give birth or rise
to," or to "manufacture."" "Producing" has never been construed
by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals as it applies to
coal. Production of natural gas ends at the well, 57 while timber is

said to be produced when it has been severed and delivered to the
mill to be manufactured into lumber. e The Gilbert court found
no dictated meaning of the word, but interpreted it as meaning
"to bring forth" from the mine" the severed and extracted coal.
Thus, production ended prior to the tippling process. This interpretation of "producing" was found to be required when the accompanying sections of article 13 of the code are read in pari
materia.
The phrase "except as otherwise provided" has been construed as referring to the seventh paragraph of section 2,50 which
provides for the taxation of a producer of coal "used or con"E.g., Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Battle, 151 W. Va. 655, 659, 154 S.E.2d
854, 857 (1967).

"5Id.
" Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 911 (1980).
57Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284, 288 (1927); Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W. Va. 373, 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Battle,
153 W. Va. 222, 232, 167 S.E.2d 890, 897 (1969); W. VA. B & 0 TAX REG. §
1.2a(F)(2) (CCH 1974).
Frazee Lumber Co. v. Haden, 156 W. Va. 844, 853, 197 S.E.2d 634, 640
(1973); State v. United States Steel Corp., 143 W. Va. 375, 380, 102 S.E.2d 354,
356 (1958); W. VA. B & O TAx REG. § 1.2a(G) Ex.8 (CCH 1974).
No. CA-6546, slip op. at 47.
" Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. Battle, 151 W. Va. 655, 662, 154 S.E.2d 854, 858
(1967).
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sumed" in another taxable activity according to its "gross proceeds or equivalent." Since "or" is a disjunctive, the words of
each phrase must be interpreted individually. Although "use" and
"consume" are often used interchangeably, the legislature in this
instance obviously intended a different and distinct meaning for
each. Thus, whereas coal may be "consumed" to produce electricity, timber is "used" to produce lumber. Likewise, a different and
distinct meaning must be given to "gross proceeds" and
"equivalent." In using the disjunctive, the legislature must have
foreseen the situation in which the producer of coal would not sell
his coal, but instead "use or consume" it in another taxable activity. If and when this occurred, the coal was to be valued for tax
purposes at the equivalent of the gross proceeds which would
have been received had the coal been sold.
The final determination of the validity of Gilbert rests upon
whether the tippling processes are a taxable activity under section
2b. Activities taxable thereunder include "manufacturing, compounding, or preparing for sale." Courts have sometimes stated
that the term "manufacturing" or "manufacturer" as used in tax
statutes is not susceptible of a definition that is exact and allembracing.61 A number of cases define manufacturing, but in all
these cases the courts consistently deferred to the purpose of the
legislation and attempted to provide a construction62in accord with
what they determined to be the legislative intent.
Besides considering the terms of the statute and the legislative intent, the extent of the use of mechanical devices should be
closely examined, as should the degree or extent of the change in
the appearance, form, quality, and value of the basic material
used in the particular process. 6 3 Processes which make use of
mechanical devices are considered to be capital intensive, which
in turn are often defined as "manufacturing."'" However,
mechanical devices are used extensively for extracting the coal
from the mine and transporting it to the mouth of the mine.
Thus, the mere use of mechanical devices in screening, grading,
crushing, and washing the coal may not of itself suffice to distinAnnot., 17 A.L.R.3d 7, 23 (1968).
Co. v. Ross, 183 Ky. 217, 209 S.W. 39 (1919).
e3See note 61 supra, at § 3.
. Ballard's Farm Sausage, Inc. v. Dailey, 246 S.E.2d 265, 267 (W. Va. 1978).
61

2P.Lorrilard
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guish tippling as a manufacturing process. More persuasive,
though, is the degree or extent of the change in the appearance,
form, quality, and value from the raw coal to the tippled coal.
Coal tippling processes may not drastically change the appearance or the physical form of the raw coal, but its quality and
value are affected. As a result of tippling processes performed by
Gilbert, approximately thirty percent of the raw product was removed and disposed of as unsalable material. Without question,
the quality of the coal was improved. Also, Gilbert's tippling
processes increased the value of the coal from $11.00 to $17.50 per
ton. The change in quality and value indicate that the tippling
process was used to prepare the coal for sale.
Yet, courts in other jurisdictions have refused to consider the
screening, picking, crushing, and washing of coal as constituting a
manufacturing process. These decisions are based on the premise
that there must be a transformation, a new and different article,
in order for a process to be deemed manufacturing, 5 and the tippling processes of coal were not considered to have induced such
a change. The issue in both Duke Power Co. v. Clayton"6 and Colley v. Eastern Coal Corp.,'7 however, was not the proper classification of the tippling activity under a privilege taxing statute;
rather, the issue was whether the tippling of coal was a manufacturing activity sufficient to exempt the taxpayers from a sales and
use tax and a property tax, respectively. Thus, these decisions are
of little value in defining the activity for purposes of a privilege
taxing statute. However, a process by which a company mines
ores and subsequently separates the gold and silver within the
ores from the refuse was found taxable under a statute notably
similar to section 2b."
65 Anheuser-Busch Brewing As'n v. United States, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1907).
See generally Ballard's Farm Sausage, Inc. v. Dailey, 246 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va.
1978).
1 274 N.C. 505, 164 S.E.2d
289 (1968).
7 470 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1971).

"Bald Mountain Mining Co. v. Welsh, 65 S.D. 117, 271 N.W. 819 (1937).
1933 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 184, § 2a, provides:
Upon every person, engaging or continuing within this State in the business of manufacturing, processing, compounding, or preparing for sale,
profit or use, any article or articles, substance or substances, commodity
or commodities, the amount of such tax to be equal to the value of the
articles manufactured, processed, compounded or prepared for sale, as
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Regardless of whether the tippling of coal constitutes manufacturing, the activity may be taxed as another privilege under
section 2b. By using the disjunctive, the legislature expressed its
intent to tax any of the three activities of "manufacturing," or
"compounding," or "preparing for sale," rather than to tax an activity which would consist of "manufacturing, compounding, and
preparing." This analysis is supported by the subsequent language appearing in section 2b that the tax is to be measured by
the gross proceeds of sales by the "manufacturer or person compounding or preparing the same." 85 "1 Had the legislature intended to tax just one business activity, it very easily could have
adopted the conjunctive particle instead of the disjunctive. Thus,
under section 2b the issue cannot be limited merely to whether
the tippling activity constitutes manufacturing, but also must include whether the activity constitutes preparing for sale or
compounding.
The court in Duke Power Co. stated in dictum that subsequent to mining the coal and bringing it to the surface, the coal is
processed, or prepared, for sale." The steps recognized by the
court in this processing were separation of impurities, crushing,
and cleaning the coal. Both the Duke Power Co. and the Colley
decisions analogized the coal tippling activities to stone-crushing,
an activity not generally categorized as manufacturing .70 But although the crushing of stone is insufficient to constitute a manufacturing activity, the tippling of coal is a requisite in preparing it
for sale to the ultimate consumer. "Preparing for sale" does not
connote the production of a new article with a distinctive name,
character, or use; it instead merely indicates some function performed on an article of commerce before its sale to the ultimate
consumer. Not only are coal tippling activities required for the
purpose of removing unsalable material prior to its efficient use
by the consumer, but also new federal clean air standards and air
pollution control laws7 1 require the removal of foreign matter

shown by the gross proceeds derived from the sale thereof by the manufacturer...
8.
(Emphasis added).
88 274 N.C. at 514, 164 S.E.2d at 295.
70 See, e.g., Shumacher Stone Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Ohio, 134 Ohio St. 529,

18 N.E.2d 405 (1938).
71

42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. I 1977).
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often effectively before the coal may be burned. These additional
requirements imposed upon coal as a result of its use as a source
of energy make any analogy between the tippling of coal and the
crushing of stone fallacious.
In addition, the current Business and Occupation Tax (B &
0 Tax) regulations recognize that when a coal broker engages in
activities such as the screening, grading, and washing of coal, he
72

may be taxed for the privilege of preparing the coal for sale

Obviously, a coal producer who performs these same functions is
similarly situated to the coal broker while exercising this privilege. Yet, under the current B & 0 Tax regulations, the coal producer is taxed for exercising these privileges at the producer's
rate instead of the manufacturer's rate7 s In a similar situation,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not consider an
administrative construction of a statute to be binding upon that
court.74 Thus, a reasonable way to ensure a constitutional applica-

tion of the statute is to classify both coal brokers and coal producers as "preparers for sale" when they are performing the tippling function. This result is inevitable when sections 2, 2a, and
2b are read in pari materia.
V.

LEGISLATVE RESPONSE TO

Gilbert

Prompted by the Gilbert decision and by the threat of an
impairment of tax revenues, the West Virginia Legislature has attempted to further and more clearly define the legislative intent
of the tax statutes. This response came in the form of an amendment to section 2a(1) and provides in pertinent part:
(1) Coal, three and five-tenths percent. The value of coal
mined and produced in this state in the exercise of the production privilege, taxable at the rates herein and in section
two-i in conjunction with section two of this article, shall include in addition to the value of the mined product those values arising from the ordinary processing and preparing of such
coal for sale or commercial use, where such processing and
preparing is done by the producer of the coal. Ordinary
processing and preparing of coal activities by the producer

72S

W. VA. B & 0 TAx REG. § 1.2b(H) Fx3 (CCH 1974).

71

Id. §§ 1.2a(A), (G) Exs. 1-3 (CCH 1974).

74

Jones v. Columbian Carbon Co., 132 W. Va. 219, 223, 51 S.E.2d 790, 792

(1948).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980

15

1380

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 [1980], Art. 53

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

thereof are considered an integral part of the production privilege and include crushing, washing, cleaning, drying, sorting,
sizing, blending, loading for shipment and the like applied in
the ordinary mining of such products to make the same salable
and commercially usuable. The values taxable herein and attributable to such ordinary processing and preparing of coal
activities will not be again taxable under the provisions of section two-b of this article to the producer of such coal. More
sophisticated processing and preparing of coal activities shall
7
be subject to the other applicable provisions of this article. 5
This amendment makes clear the legislative intent to tax only at
the coal producer's rate, and not at two different rates, those coal
producers who also subject their coal to the specified tippling
processes.
While this amendment removes any need for the courts to
interpret business and occupation tax statutes as they apply to
coal producers, the disparate treatment of coal producers and coal
brokers at issue in Gilbert still remains. For, as a note to the
amendment states:
The purpose of this bill is to indicate the classified status
of producers of natural resource products under the production privilege section of the Business and Occupation tax law.
Within the coal classification of such section of the B & 0 tax
law (section 2a of article 13, chapter 11), the bill specifies that
the measure of the tax on such privilege includes the values
arising from ordinary tippling, processing and preparing for
sale or commercial use by the producer of such coal and that
such activities are an integral part of the single production
privilege; thus codifying and continuing the present, actual
practice and administrationby coal producers and the State
Tax Department and stabilizing normal receipts from coal
7
production activities.
A reasonable inference from this note is that coal brokers are to
be taxed at the manufacturer's rate, as before, while all coal producers are to be taxed at the producer's rate.
As previously discussed, there is no constitutional provision
requiring the application of a uniform rate to all classes of busi-

15 H.B. 847, 64th W. V, Legis., Reg. Sess. (1980) (to be codified at W. VA.
CODE § 11-13-2a) (emphasis added).
76 Id. (emphasis added).
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nesses on which the privilege taxes are imposed. Also, the legislature may exercise its discretion in determining the categories of
activities for privilege tax purposes. However, the equal protection clause does require that all those similarly situated and all
members of the same class receive uniform treatment, unless it is
shown that the disparate treatment is reasonable and based on
pertinent and real differences for a purpose germane to the
legislation."
This constitutional requirement immediately casts doubt
upon the amendment. No apparent reason exists for taxing the
coal producer (who also tipples his coal) at the producer's rate for
the increased value created by tippling, while taxing a coal broker
who performs the same activities on coal after its removal from
the mine at the lower manufacturer's rate. The coal broker and
coal producer are obviously "similarly situated" while performing
the tippling activity, but the coal producer is penalized (when
compared to the coal broker) merely because he also mines the
coal he tipples. The tippling of coal is a function separable from
the mining of coal, as evidenced by the marketing of both tippled
and untippled coal. Since they are separable functions, the privilege of engaging in each should be taxed separately according to
the privilege exercised, not the performance of some preceding
privilege. Thus, by failing to resolve these inconsistencies, the legislature has opened the amendment to attack on constitutional
grounds.
VI.

ALTERNATIVES

In the event that the recently enacted amendment is challenged and declared unconstitutional, viable alternatives are
available to the legislature to further the policy goals of the Business and Occupation Tax. These alternatives are, for the most
part, methods of taxation adopted by other states.
One possible alternative is the previously mentioned specific
severance tax.18 Under a specific severance tax a flat rate would
be levied against the number of units produced. This type of tax
is favored for its ease of administration and application. It finds

11 See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
76

See, e.g., AkA. CODE §§ 40-13-2, -31 (1975); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5749.02

(Page Supp. 1978).
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disfavor under the policy of equitable tax treatment, though, because the relative burden on individual taxpayers will decrease
with higher profits and increase with lower profits. The tax burden under a specific severance tax does not vary with cost. 9
. Other possible alternatives vary from state to state by the
wording in the ad valorem severance tax statutes. New Mexico,
for example, imposes a three-tiered Resources Excise Tax. 80 The
Resources Tax8 1 is levied on the privilege of severing natural resources and is based on the gross value of the resource at the time
it is severed, without any allowable deductions for production
costs. The Processor TaX82 is imposed on the privilege of processing8 s natural resources and is generally based on the gross value
of the resource after processing, without allowable deductions. If
a resource is processsed in New Mexico and the processor tax is
paid, the resource is exempt from the Resources Tax. A Service
Tax" is imposed on persons severing or processing in New Mexico natural resources owned by another person and not otherwise
taxed by the Resources Tax or the Processor Tax.
Montana imposes a hybrid tax by which a producer is classified either as a surface mine or an underground mine and taxed
on a graduated scale based on the heating value of the coal. The
tax has a fiat rate floor which is applied in conjunction with a
graduated ad valorem rate. 85
Although these state statutes are viable options, there are
reasonable alternatives available to the West Virginia Legislature
that would not require an abandonment of the current taxing
scheme. An immediate remedy available solely for the purpose of
maintaining general revenues would be the imposition of a surtax
upon the current tax rate. A related long-range remedy would be
Note, Approaches to State Taxation of the Mining Industry, 10 NAT. RES.

7

J. 156 (1970). See also M. GAFI N, ExTmacvE RESOURCES AND TAXAN (1967).
o N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-25-1 to -9 (1978).
81Id.

SId.

§ 4.
§5.

Id. § 3(D) defines "processing" as smelting, leaching, refining, reducing,
compounding or otherwise preparing for sale or commercial use any natural resource so that its character or condition is materially changed in mills or plants
located in New Mexico.
- Id. § 6.
"

MoNT. Rxv. CODES ANN.

§ 84-1314 (Cune. Supp. 1977).
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the adjustment of tax rates for both the coal producing classification and the "preparing for sale" classification to meet general
revenue requirements. Perhaps an even more reasonable remedy,
though, would be the reclassification of the coal tippling activity
of both coal producers and coal brokers from the "preparing for
sale" classification to the coal producing classification. Coupled
with this reclassification would be a credit allowed to coal brokers
for B & 0 taxes already paid by the producer of the raw coal.
This remedy would be more in line with the historical treatment
of coal producing activities, and would allow for both satisfaction
of general revenue requirements and equitable treatment of
taxpayers.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Business and Occupation Tax is imposed in West Virginia upon the privilege of doing business. As such, a person may
simultaneously engage in two or more activities which may each
be subject to this privilege tax. Two of the activities taxable are
the mining of coal and the tippling of coal. Under current and
past West Virginia law, a person whose only activity is the tippling of coal is taxed at a different rate for this activity than a
person who mines and tipples coal. Since the tippling activity is
the same whether the person also mined the coal or not, disparate
treatment exists in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution. To remedy this situation, the taxing statute should be amended to accommodate coal brokers
within the coal producer's tax rate, thus according the same treatment to those similarly situated.
John Kent Dorsey
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